Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol (Cooperation Of Nodes - Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) by Buchegger, Sonja & Le Boudec, Jean-Yves
Performance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol
(Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc
NeTworks)
Sonja Buchegger
IBM Zurich Research Laboratory
Sa¨umerstrasse 4
CH-8803 Ru¨schlikon, Switzerland
sob@zurich.ibm.com
Jean-Yves Le Boudec
EPFL-IC-LCA
Ecublens
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
jean-yves.leboudec@epfl.ch
ABSTRACT
Mobile ad-hoc networking works properly only if the par-
ticipating nodes cooperate in routing and forwarding. How-
ever, it may be advantageous for individual nodes not to
cooperate. We propose a protocol, called CONFIDANT,
for making misbehavior unattractive; it is based on selec-
tive altruism and utilitarianism. It aims at detecting and
isolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive to
deny cooperation. Trust relationships and routing decisions
are based on experienced, observed, or reported routing and
forwarding behavior of other nodes. The detailed implemen-
tation of CONFIDANT in this paper assumes that the net-
work layer is based on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)
protocol. We present a performance analysis of DSR forti-
fied by CONFIDANT and compare it to regular defenseless
DSR. It shows that a network with CONFIDANT and up
to 60% of misbehaving nodes behaves almost as well as a
benign network, in sharp contrast to a defenseless network.
All simulations have been implemented and performed in
GloMoSim.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-
Communication Networks—Network Protocols
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Economics, Reliability, Security,
Human Factors
Keywords
routing, cooperation, reputation, mobile ad-hoc networks,
fairness, robustness, trust
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1. INTRODUCTION
The CONFIDANT protocol works as an extension to a
reactive source-routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks.
For the simulation implementation, we have chosen Dynamic
Source Routing (DSR) as the base protocol. In the following
subsections we briefly describe what we need to know about
DSR, describe the attacks we support, and specify how we
want to thwart them.
1.1 Background: the DSR Protocol
Dynamic Source Routing is a protocol developed for rout-
ing in mobile ad-hoc networks and was proposed for MANET
by Broch, Johnson, and Maltz [8]. In a nutshell, it works
as follows: Nodes send out a ROUTE REQUEST message,
all nodes that receive this message put themselves into the
source route and forward it to their neighbors, unless they
have received the same request before. If a receiving node is
the destination, or has a route to the destination, it does not
forward the request, but sends a REPLY message contain-
ing the full source route. It may send that reply along the
source route in reverse order or issue a ROUTE REQUEST
including the route to get back to the source, if the former
is not possible due to asymmetric links. ROUTE REPLY
messages can be triggered by ROUTE REQUEST messages
or are gratuitous. After receiving one or several routes, the
source selects the best (by default the shortest), stores it,
and sends messages along that path. The better the route
metrics (number of hops, delay, bandwidth, or other criteria)
and the sooner the REPLY arrives at the source, the higher
the preference given to the route and the longer it will stay
in the cache. When a ROUTE REPLY arrives very quickly
after a ROUTE REQUEST has been sent out this is an in-
dication of a short path, since the nodes are required to wait
for a time corresponding to the length of the route they can
advertise, before sending it. This is done in order to avoid
a storm of replies. In case of a link failure, the node that
cannot forward the packet to the next node sends an error
message towards the source. Routes that contain a failed
link can be ‘salvaged’ by taking an alternate partial route
that does not contain the bad link.
1.2 Attacks against routing
The lack of infrastructure and organizational environment
of mobile ad-hoc networks offer special opportunities to at-
tackers. Without proper security it is possible to gain vari-
ous advantages by malicious behavior, such as
• better service than cooperating nodes,
• monetary benefits by exploiting incentive measures or
trading confidential information,
• saving power by selfish behavior,
• preventing someone else from obtaining proper service,
• extracting data to get confidential information, and so
on.
Several routing and forwarding attacks on DSR have been
described in [3]. We aim at protection against the following
types of misbehavior.
• No forwarding (of control messages or data).
• Traffic deviation: unusual traffic attraction (adver-
tises many excellent routes or advertises routes very
rapidly, so they are deemed good routes) or the oppo-
site (claims to have only bad routes).
• Route salvaging, i.e., rerouting to avoid a broken link,
although no error has been observed.
• Lack of error messages, although an error has been
observed, or vice versa.
• Unusually frequent route updates.
• Silent route change (tampering with the message header
of either control or data packets).
1.3 Thwarting Attacks
A method for thwarting attacks is prevention. According
to Schneier [14], a prevention-only strategy only works if the
prevention mechanisms are perfect; otherwise, someone will
find out how to get around them. Most of the attacks and
vulnerabilities have been the result of bypassing prevention
mechanisms. Given this reality, detection and response are
essential (see also Section 2 for a discussion on strong pre-
vention mechanisms such as [4]).
In this paper, we propose a method based on detection
of misbehavior, followed by a reaction. We would like to
achieve that only good behavior pay off in terms of service
and reasonable power consumption.
Thus, in our scheme detection has to trigger a response,
i.e., a reaction of other nodes that results in a disadvantage
for the malicious node.
We propose that packets of malicious nodes should, upon
detection of the node’s malice, not be forwarded by normally
behaving nodes. If, however, a node was wrongly accused
of being malicious or turns out to be a repenting offender
that is no longer malicious and that has behaved normally
for a certain amount of time, some sort of ‘re-socialization’
and re-integration into the network communications should
be possible.
With the scheme we present in this paper, it is disadvan-
tageous for nodes to behave maliciously; it is inspired by an
example in ecology explained in Section 3.1.
1.4 Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Re-
lated work is discussed in Section 2, followed by a description
of the CONFIDANT protocol in Section 3. Section 4 gives
a first performance evaluation of CONFIDANT, in the case
where attacks are “no forwarding”. Future work is outlined
in Section 5 and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. RELATED WORK
Anderson and Stajano [1] authenticate users by ‘imprint-
ing’ according to the analogy of ducklings acknowledging the
first moving subject they see as their mother, but enabling
the devices to be imprinted several times. The imprinting
is realized by accepting a symmetric encryption key from
the first device that sends such a key. They do not address
routing or forwarding, however, user authentication and au-
thorization are an important prerequisite for trust in the
network layer also in mobile ad-hoc networks.
Zhou and Haas [18] employ asynchronous threshold se-
curity and share refreshing for distributed certification au-
thorities for key management in mobile ad-hoc networks.
They take advantage of inherent redundancies in mobile ad-
hoc networks given by multiple routes to enable diversity
coding, allowing for byzantine failures given by several cor-
rupted nodes or collusions. The approach is a potentially
strong prevention mechanism, however, to the best of our
knowledge, the impact on the network and security perfor-
mance have not yet been published.
Smith, Murthy, and Garcia-Luna-Aceves [15] examined
the routing security of distance vector protocols in general
and developed countermeasures for vulnerabilities by pro-
tecting both routing messages and routing updates. They
propose sequence numbers and digital signatures for both
routing messages and updates as well as including predeces-
sor information in routing updates. Digital signatures have
also been suggested for the OSPF routing protocol by Mur-
phy and Badger [11]. It remains to be investigated whether,
and how, digital signatures can be employed in mobile ad-
hoc networks. The CONFIDANT protocol also addresses
routing misbehavior but in addition gives strong incentives
for correct forwarding.
Buttya´n and Hubaux proposed incentives to cooperate by
means of so-called nuglets [4] that serve as a per-hop pay-
ment in every packet or counters [5] in a secure module
in each node to encourage forwarding. One of their find-
ings is that increased cooperation is beneficial not only for
the entire network but also for individual nodes, which con-
forms to our results. The main differences to the CONFI-
DANT protocol are that nuglets or counters are limited to a
one-to-one interaction, whereas in the CONFIDANT proto-
col, misbehavior results in a bad reputation propagating to
more than one node and that the CONFIDANT protocol ad-
dresses additional issues in the network layer, such as traffic
diversion. The question of a tamper-proof security module
remains controversial [12], but might prove inevitable. As
opposed to nuglets and counters, the CONFIDANT proto-
col does not need tamper-proof hardware for itself, since a
malicious node neither knows the entries of its reputation
in other nodes nor does it have access to all other nodes
for potential modification. The secure module might still be
necessary for complementary protection such as authentica-
tion.
Marti, Giuli, Lai, and Baker [9] observed that through-
put increased in mobile ad-hoc networks by complement-
ing DSR with a ‘watchdog’ for detection of non-forwarding
nodes and a ‘pathrater’ (for trust management and rout-
ing policy, every path used is rated), which enable nodes
to avoid non-forwarding nodes in their routes. Ratings are
kept about every node in the network and the rating of ac-
tively used nodes is updated periodically. Their approach
does not punish malicious nodes that do not cooperate, but
rather relieves them of the burden of forwarding for others,
whereas their messages are forwarded without complaint.
This way, the malicious nodes are rewarded and reinforced
in their behavior. In contrast, we would like to achieve the
opposite with our protocol.
The Security-aware Ad-hoc Routing (SAR) protocol by
Yi, Naldburg, and Kravets [16] modifies AODV to include
security metrics for path computation and selection. They
define trust levels according to organizational hierarchies
with a shared key for each level, so that nodes can state
their security requirements when requesting a route and
only nodes that meet these requirements (trust level, met-
rics), participate in the routing. Questions not addressed
by this protocol yet include the mechanism for key distribu-
tion, knowledge of the keys of the other nodes, what happens
when a node leaves the group with the shared trust level and
how trust hierarchies are defined in the first place, especially
in civilian applications. SAR relies on tamper-proof hard-
ware.
3. WHEN NODES BEAR GRUDGES - THE
CONFIDANT PROTOCOL
We now describe the protocol. First we give the ratio-
nale and explain how it finds its root in an ecological anal-
ogy. Then we describe the components of CONFIDANT,
assumed to be present in every node. Lastly, we describe
the protocol with free text and a finite state machine.
3.1 The Selfish Gene: from birds to network
nodes
As explained by Richard Dawkins in ‘The Selfish Gene’
[6], reciprocal altruism is beneficial for every ecological sys-
tem when favors are granted simultaneously, so there is an
intrinsic motivation for cooperation because of instant grati-
fication. The benefit of behaving well is not as obvious when
there is a delay between granting a favor and the repay-
ment. This occurs when, in mobile ad-hoc networks, nodes
forward on behalf of each other. An ecological example used
by Dawkins [6] explains the survival chances (and thus gene
selection) of birds grooming parasites off each other’s head,
which they cannot clean themselves.
Dawkins divides birds into two types: ‘suckers’ that al-
ways help and ‘cheats’ that have other birds groom parasites
off their head but fail to return the favor. In this system,
clearly the cheats have an advantage over the suckers, but
both are driven to extinction over time. Dawkins then intro-
duces a third kind of bird, the ‘grudger’ that starts out being
helpful to every bird, but bears a grudge against those birds
that do not return the favor and subsequently no longer
grooms their heads.
According to Dawkins, simulation has shown that when
starting with a majority population of cheats and marginal
groups of both suckers and grudgers, the grudgers win over
time. Winning is defined as obtaining the greatest benefit,
assuming a cost for grooming another bird’s head and a
profit for having one’s head groomed, with a loss leading to
extinction and profit leading to multiplication of the species.
The rationale is as follows: the suckers do more favors than
they receive because of the large number of cheats, so the
number of suckers decreases, whereas the number of cheats
increases. The grudgers also suffer some loss, but less than
the suckers. Once the suckers are extinct, the grudgers grow
rapidly at the expense of the cheats, because they do not
help a cheat twice and cheats are also not helped by other
cheats. After a while, the number of cheats decreases more
slowly, because the probability of a first-help by a grudger
increases with a higher population of grudgers. Over all,
the population of grudgers grows, whereas the other species
become extinct.
Defining suitable cost and profit to routing and forward-
ing favors and keeping a history of experiences with non-
cooperating nodes achieve the same results as the grudger
species, i.e., driving the cheats out of business. In a very
large ad-hoc network, convergence can be very slow, and
keeping a history of all bad experiences with other nodes
equals large storage requirements and long lists to go through.
Therefore, we propose the following ideas, which are incor-
porated in the CONFIDANT protocol explained in the next
section, to speed up the triumph of grudger nodes.
• Learn from observed behavior: employ ‘neighborhood
watch’ to be warned by observing what happens to
other nodes in the neighborhood, before having to make
a bad experience oneself.
• Learn from reported behavior: share information of
experienced malicious behavior with friends and also
learn from them.
3.2 CONFIDANT Components
CONFIDANT consists of the following components, as
shown in Figure 1: The Monitor, the Reputation Sys-
tem, the Path Manager, and the Trust Manager.
The components are present in every node.
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Figure 1: Trust architecture and finite state machine
within each node.
3.2.1 The Monitor (Neighborhood Watch)
In a wireless networking environment, the nodes most
likely to detect non-compliant behavior are the nodes in the
vicinity of the offender and in some cases the source and
the destination, if they detect unusual behavior or do not
get proper responses. The latter is not always the case, for
instance in the case of replay. One approach to protocol
enforcement and detection of damaging behavior (intrusion,
misuse of cooperation incentives, denial of service, etc.) sug-
gested here is the equivalent of a neighborhood watch, where
nodes locally look for deviating nodes.
The nodes of the neighborhood watch can detect devia-
tions by the next node on the source route by either listening
to the transmission of the next node (so-called ‘passive ac-
knowledgement’) or by observing route protocol behavior.
By keeping a copy of a packet while listening to the trans-
mission of the next node, any content change can also be
detected. All misbehaviors listed in Section 1.2 can be indi-
cated. However, in the GloMoSim simulations used for this
report, only “no forwarding” attacks are implemented.
As a component within each node, the monitor registers
these deviations from normal behavior. As soon as a given
bad behavior occurs, the reputation system is called.
3.2.2 The Trust Manager
In an ad-hoc environment, trust management has to be
distributed and adaptive [2]. This component deals with
incoming and outgoing ALARM messages.
ALARM messages are sent by the trust manager of a node
to warn others of malicious nodes. Outgoing ALARMS are
generated by the node itself after having experienced, ob-
served, or received a report of malicious behavior. The recip-
ients of these ALARM messages are so-called friends, which
are administered in a friends list. How to win friends in a
mobile ad-hoc network dynamically is still on our research
agenda, however, for the moment we consider friends to be
configured in a way similar to device imprinting as described
by Anderson and Stajano [1] on a user-to-user basis.
Incoming ALARMs originate from either outside friends
or other nodes, so the source of an ALARM has to be
checked for trustworthiness before triggering a reaction, thus
there is a filtering of incoming ALARM messages accord-
ing to the trust level of the reporting node. A mechanism
similar to the trust management in Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) for key validation and certification is used here for
mobile ad-hoc networks for trust management for routing
and forwarding. In PGP [19], several levels of trust can
be expressed, e.g., unknown, none, marginal, and complete.
When PGP calculates the validity of a public key, it exam-
ines the trust level of all the attached certifying signatures.
It computes a weighted score of validity. For example, two
marginally trusted signatures might be deemed credible as
one completely trusted signature. The weighting scheme
is adjustable so that it can require a different number of
marginally trusted signatures to judge a key as valid. We
use the same principle but for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient trusted evidence for the misbe-
havior of a node.
The trust manager consists of the following components.
• An alarm table containing information about received
alarms.
• A trust table managing trust levels for nodes to deter-
mine the trustworthiness of an alarm.
• A friends list containing all friends a node potentially
sends alarms to.
For routing and forwarding, trust is important when mak-
ing a decision about
• providing or accepting routing information,
• accepting a node as part of a route, and
• taking part in a route originated by some other node.
3.2.3 The Reputation System (Node Rating)
Reputation systems are used in some online auctioning
systems. They provide a means of obtaining a quality rating
of participants of transactions by having both the buyer and
the seller give each other feedback on how their activities
were perceived and evaluated. For a detailed explanation of
reputation systems see Resnick et al. [13].
To avoid a centralized rating, local rating lists and/or
black lists are maintained at each node and potentially ex-
changed with friends. In the route request nodes can include
that black sheep be avoided for routing, which also alarms
nodes along the way. Nodes can look up senders in the black
list containing the nodes with bad rating before forwarding
anything for them. The problem of how to distinguish al-
leged from proven malicious nodes, i.e., how to avoid false
accusations, can be lessened by timeout and subsequent re-
covery or revocation lists of nodes that have behaved well
for a specified period of time. Another problem is scala-
bility and how to avoid blown-up lists, which can also be
addressed by timeouts.
The reputation system in this protocol manages a table
consisting of entries for nodes and their rating. The rating
is changed only when there is sufficient evidence of mali-
cious behavior that is significant for a node and that has
occurred a number of times exceeding a threshold to rule
out coincidences. The rating is then changed according to
a rate function that assigns different weights to the type of
behavior detection, namely the greatest weight for own ex-
perience, a smaller weight for observations in the neighbor-
hood, and an even smaller weight for reported experience.
The rationale for this weighting scheme is that nodes trust
their own experiences and observations more than those of
other nodes.
Once the weight has been determined, the entry of the
node that misbehaved is changed accordingly. If the rating
of a node in the table has deteriorated so much as to fall
out of a tolerable range, the path manager is called for ac-
tion. Bearing in mind that malicious behavior will ideally be
the exception rather than the norm, the reputation system
is built on negative experience rather than positive impres-
sions. The issues of positive change and timeout are still to
be addressed in detail.
3.2.4 The Path Manager
The path manager performs the following functions:
• Path re-ranking according to security metric, e.g., rep-
utation of the nodes in the path.
• Deletion of paths containing malicious nodes.
• Action on receiving a request for a route from a mali-
cious node (e.g., ignore, do not send any reply).
• Action on receiving request for a route containing a
malicious node in the source route (e.g. ignore, alert
the source).
3.3 Protocol Description
As shown in Figure 1, each node monitors the behavior
of its next-hop neighbors. If a suspicious event is detected,
the information is given to the reputation system. If the
event is significant for the node, it is checked whether it
has occurred more often than a predefined threshold, which
is high enough to distinguish deliberate malicious behav-
ior from simple coincidences such as collisions. What con-
stitutes the significance rating can be defined for different
types of nodes according to their security requirements. If
the occurrence threshold is exceeded, the reputation system
updates the rating of the node that caused the event. If
the rating turns out to be intolerable, the information is
relayed to the path manager, which proceeds to delete all
routes containing the intolerable node from the path cache.
The node continues to monitor the neighborhood, and an
ALARM message is sent as described below.
In order to convey warning information, an ALARM mes-
sage is sent by the trust manager component. This message
contains the type of protocol violation, the number of occur-
rences observed, whether the message was self-originated by
the sender, the address of the reporting node, the address of
the observed node, and the destination address (either the
source of the route or the address of a friend that might be
interested). In the present simulation implementation, the
ALARM is sent to the source of the concerned route.
When the monitor component of a node receives such an
ALARM message, it passes it on to the trust manager, where
the source of the message is evaluated. If the source is at
least partially trusted, the table containing the ALARMs
is updated. If there is sufficient evidence that the node re-
ported in the ALARM is malicious, the information is sent to
the reputation system where it is again evaluated for signif-
icance, number of occurrences, and accumulated reputation
of the node as explained in Section 3.2.3. Sufficient evi-
dence means that either the source of the ALARM is fully
trusted or that several partially trusted nodes have reported
the same and their respective assigned trust adds up to a
value of one entirely trusted node or more.
4. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
4.1 Goal
The objective of this performance analysis is to determine
the impact of the CONFIDANT routing protocol extensions
on metrics, as described in Section 4.2, in an ad-hoc network
where part of the population acts maliciously. The regular
DSR protocol is used as a reference. For all these metrics,
we want to investigate the scalability in terms of number of
nodes, fraction of malicious nodes, and mobility.
For future work, our goal is also to learn how protocol
parameters such as thresholds should be set. Given these
parameters we will determine how many friends per benign
node are needed to tolerate a given percentage of malicious
nodes.
4.2 Metrics
The following metrics are considered.
Throughput, Goodput, Dropped Packets. One metric
is the resulting total goodput G of a network with n
nodes, i.e., the data forwarded to the correct destina-
tion for each node i. We express this as:
G =
∑n
i=1
PacketsReceived∑n
i=1
PacketsOriginated
(1)
As opposed to the throughput, packet loss and retrans-
missions are taken into account. The goodput is di-
rectly influenced by packet loss. Packet loss can occur
due to general network conditions causing link errors
or unreachable nodes, but packets can also be lost be-
cause an intermediate node intentionally drops them.
The latter is the only form of packet loss directly at-
tributable to malicious behavior. We therefore use the
number of intentionally dropped packets as a metric,
both in absolute numbers and relative to the number
of packets originated.
Overhead. Since the cost of internal computation in terms
of energy consumption is negligible compared to the
cost of a transmission, we look at the overhead caused
by extra messages and define the total overhead O in a
network of n nodes as follows. We consider each trans-
mission tx of a control message, not only origination
or reception.
O =
∑n
i=1
ALARMtx∑n
i=1
RREQtx + RREPtx + ERRORtx
(2)
We use this ratio to determine how much extra over-
head the CONFIDANT extensions cause relative to
the regular routing overhead. The overhead that can
be clearly attributed to the CONFIDANT extensions
are the ALARM messages transmitted. The messages
ROUTE-REQUEST, ROUTE-REPLY and ERROR in
the case of DSR or, to be more general, any messages
needed for rerouting depend on the underlying routing
protocol. The CONFIDANT protocol points out the
identity of misbehaving nodes and allows the routing
protocol to reroute around them.
Utility. We try to determine whether cooperation pays off
for a node. One metric that directly reflects a cost-
benefit trade-off is the ratio of how many of the trans-
missions of a node are originated or received by the
node itself versus how many are just forwarded as an
intermediate node on behalf of other nodes. Thus we
look at the ratio of originated to transmitted packets.
Assuming a cost cf of forwarding a packet (composed
of power, CPU usage, and memory usage) and a ben-
efit br when receiving a packet as a destination or bs
when having an own packet received by the destina-
tion, we define the utility u of a node i as
ui = br
∑
Packetsreceived
+ bs
∑
Packetssent successfully
− cf
∑
Packetstransmitted (3)
The total utility U for the network of n nodes is de-
noted by:
U =
n∑
i=1
ui (4)
4.3 Simulation Setup
For the performance analysis of the protocol extensions,
the metrics are observed in various network scenarios given
by different modifications of the DSR protocol. The first
network we analyze is a regular well-behaved DSR network
which is used as a reference.
We then introduce compromised nodes that do not coop-
erate. These malicious nodes do not forward messages for
other nodes. The next kind of network we use for analysis
is a network containing a certain fraction of malicious nodes
but no defense mechanism, we call it ‘defenseless’.
Then we use a version of DSR that we enhanced with
CONFIDANT extensions and refer to it as ‘fortified’. The
first enhancement towards a fortified network is the reaction
of a node to its own bad experience. If a node notices that its
next-hop neighbor does not forward, it will avoid that node
for future communications. The second enhancement is to
include the case when the neighbor node fails to forward a
packet for some other node and it is detected. The third
enhancement is given by warnings (ALARM messages) sent
to the source by friends that observe that a node is behav-
ing maliciously. To take this one step further, nodes can
use the information contained in ALARM messages that
they overhear promiscuously, irrespective of whether they
are the actual destination of the message, i.e., the source of
the compromised route or a friend. In the simulation, every
benign node is a friend of the source and informs the source
when packets are maliciously dropped by the next hop. This
represents an almost ideal case given the presence of mali-
cious nodes, except that nodes in this implementation do
not propagate ALARMs to friends other than the source.
Future performance analysis will determine the number of
friends actually needed to sufficiently limit the influence of
malicious nodes.
Out of the variety of routing and forwarding attacks on
DSR found in [3] , we concentrate on forwarding defection
for this performance analysis, because it can be detected
easily and its impact on network performance can be mea-
sured.
The simulation is implemented on GloMoSim [17], a simu-
lator for mobile ad-hoc networks. Unless otherwise specified,
the experiments were repeated ten times with varying ran-
dom seed. The seed influences the placement and movement
of the nodes. Whenever confidence intervals are shown in
plots, the confidence level on these intervals is 95 %.
The fixed parameters for the simulation are listed in Ta-
ble 1. The radio range, sending capacity, and MAC have
been chosen to represent an off-the-shelf device, the speed is
uniformly distributed between 0 and 20 m/s to offer a range
of users that are in a fixed location, walking, or driving a
car; the chosen area approximately represents the center of
a town. The simulation time is chosen to be long enough to
potentially roam the whole area. The mobility model cho-
sen is the Random Waypoint Model, in which nodes move
to a random destination at a speed uniformly distributed
between 0 m/s and a specified maximum speed. Once they
Table 1: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Level
Area 1000 m × 1000 m
Speed uniformly distributed
between 0 and 20 m/s
Radio Range 250 m
Placement uniform
Movement random waypoint model
MAC 802.11
Sending capacity 2 Mbps
Application CBR
Packet size 64 B
Simulation time 900 s
in the following:in the following:
reach this destination, they stay there for as long as specified
in the pause time parameter. The reason for this movement
model is to have a random movement with pauses with the
aim to reflect realistic user behavior. The placement has
been chosen to start with a good network connectivity over
the whole area. Finally, CBR has been chosen for traffic (we
refer to it as applications) to avoid protocol particularities
of more complicated protocols such as TCP. The application
is defined as follows. A client constantly sends to a server
which in turn responds to the client. The client-server pairs
have been randomly generated for the simulation.
The factors varied are the total number of nodes in the
network, the percentage of malicious nodes, the pause time,
and the number of applications. The rationale for the choice
of these factors is given in Section 4.5.
4.4 Simulation Results
Figure 2 shows the mean number of packets dropped,
varying the pause times and the network size, i.e. the num-
ber of nodes, but keeping the fraction of malicious nodes
fixed at a third of the total population. At any time dur-
ing the simulation 10 CBR-connections are active. In the
defenseless network, the number of packets dropped inten-
tionally is up to two orders of magnitude greater than in the
network fortified by CONFIDANT. The results are fairly
constant with respect to mobility, only decreasing slightly
in the case of an almost static network at a pause time of
900 s. The fortified network is a little more sensitive to mo-
bility. This can be explained by the increased probability of
meeting a previously unknown malicious node when nodes
move around more. For future work, in order to determine
convergence of the protocol, it will be interesting to see the
distribution of dropped packets over the time of the simu-
lation to the point when the nodes have met many other
nodes already and judged their reputation.
When looking at the number of packets dropped from a
network-size perspective, it can be seen from Figure 3 that
the difference in performance increases with the total num-
ber of nodes in the network. The fortified network keeps
the number of dropped packets fairly constant irrespective
of the network size, whereas the defenseless network deterio-
rates significantly with the increasing total number of nodes.
In Figure 4, the confidence intervals are shown for the
mean ratio of number of packets dropped to packets origi-
nated. The analyzed network consists of 50 nodes and the
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Figure 2: Mean number of packets dropped versus
pause time, one third is malicious.
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Figure 3: Number of packets dropped versus num-
ber of nodes, one third is malicious, 0 pause time.
number of applications was increased to 30 in order to ob-
serve the behavior in a more heavily loaded network. DSR
fortified with CONFIDANT extensions loses only a small
fraction of packets (always less than 3%) due to malicious
nodes, whereas regular, defenseless DSR faces a significant
loss of around 70% of the packets, all other parameters being
equal. The defenseless network as opposed to the fortified
network, does not benefit from a more static network. A
more static network reduces the probability of a new node
in a route and thus the probability of meeting a malicious
node for the first time. The nodes in the fortified network
can therefore avoid the initial bad experience where packets
are dropped until the malicious node is avoided in the route,
whereas in the defenseless network the malicious nodes just
keep dropping packets without provoking a reaction of the
concerned nodes.
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Figure 4: Number of packets dropped per number
of packets sent by 50 nodes, one third malicious, 30
applications, 20 simulation runs.
Figure 5 shows how the CONFIDANT protocol copes with
a varying percentage of malicious nodes in the total network
population. The pause time is set to 0 to stress the CON-
FIDANT protocol with a very dynamic network, where it
cannot use the advantage of improving with more stabil-
ity which it showed in the previous figures. The number
of applications is equally deliberately set as high as 30 for
increased load. It can be seen that in a defenseless network,
even a small percentage of malicious nodes can wreak havoc.
There is not much difference in the number of intentionally
dropped packets as the percentage of malicious nodes in-
creases. This can be explained by the fact that it does not
matter where on the path a packet is lost. The network forti-
fied with CONFIDANT is more sensitive to the percentage
of malicious nodes, however, it still keeps the number of
deliberately dropped packets low even in a very hostile en-
vironment as given by more than half the population acting
maliciously - given that there are enough nodes to provide
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Figure 5: Number of packets dropped, 50 nodes,
30 applications, 0 pause time, varying percentage of
malicious nodes
harmless alternate partial paths around malicious nodes.
In comparing the ratio of packets sent and received in
Figure 6, the performance of the fortified network in which
a third of the population behaving maliciously is very close
to that of a regular benign DSR network without malicious
nodes. The reason that the ratio is below 100 % even in a
benign network is that losses are not only due to malicious
nodes dropping packets but also to link errors or because
nodes have moved away too quickly for the protocol to catch
up.
The goodput versus the percentage of malicious nodes is
depicted in Figure 7. The network is again highly mobile
with a pause time of 0 s, which explains the goodput of
only about 80% even for a network containing no malicious
nodes. The fortified network keeps this performance up in
the presence of up to 40% malicious nodes and deteriorates
only slightly in the presence of up to 60% malicious nodes.
Finally, with 90% or more malicious nodes the fortified net-
work can no longer improve the performance. The fact that
even in a population of only malicious nodes there is still a
goodput of about 20% can be explained by a portion of the
communication happening between nodes that are within
radio range of each other.
Figure 8 shows the throughput of clients and servers ac-
cording to the CBR applications used. Clients send at a
constant bit rate of 2 Mbits, the servers respond accord-
ing to the packets they receive. The fortified version is not
very close to the benign network, but it can also take ad-
vantage of longer pause times, i.e., a less mobile network,
whereas the performance of the defenseless version remains
unacceptable.
Figure 9 shows the ratio of ALARM messages in the total
number of control messages transmitted. It is always lower
than 3%, although factors chosen, namely number of nodes,
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Figure 6: Goodput expressed as the ratio of received
to sent packets, 50 nodes, one third malicious, 20
simulation runs.
number of applications, and fraction of malicious nodes, are
at their maximum according to Table 2, thus presenting the
least favorable case in these simulation boundaries. It is also
an upper bound given the parameters and factors of this
simulation in that the threshold for sending an ALARM
after having detected a forwarding failure is set to 1, i.e.,
every maliciously dropped packet detected is reported by an
ALARM message.
4.5 Estimation of Factor Relevance
In order to find out which factors actually have an effect
on the performance metrics and to reduce the number of
experiments, a 2kr factorial design according to Jain [7] was
performed, with k (the number of factors) being set to 3
and 5, and r (the number of repetitions of the experiment)
set to 10, resulting in 8 and 32 experiments or 80 and 320
simulation runs, respectively. Table 2 shows the factors and
the two extreme levels chosen for the experiments.
Table 2: Levels for factorial design
Factor Level 1 Level 2
Number of nodes 10 50
Protocol defenseless fortified
DSR CONFIDANT
Pause time 0 s 600 s
Percentage of 0.00% 33.33%
malicious nodes
Number of 10 30
applications
The choice for the number of nodes was made with the
intention to show both a very small network that still al-
lows for multiple paths and reasonable network connectivity
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Figure 7: Goodput, 50 nodes, 30 applications, 0
pause time, varying percentage of malicious nodes.
given the area and a larger network to get insights on scala-
bility. The pause times were chosen to reflect a very mobile
network as well as a very moderately mobile one given that
the duration of the simulation is 900 s. The extreme levels
for the percentage of malicious nodes in the network popu-
lation are motivated by the desire to show the behavior of
a network with a very high but probably still manageable
fraction of malicious nodes. This should then be compared
to a totally benign network situation. The number of appli-
cations, i.e., ongoing CBR connections, were chosen bearing
in mind both the capacity of nodes as well as scalability.
Table 3 shows the variation due to three factors, with a
constant setting of one third of the network population be-
ing malicious nodes and 10 applications taking place in the
network. It shows that the protocol, whether defenseless or
fortified, has the greatest impact on the number of dropped
packets in the presence of malicious nodes, which confirms
the intuitive expectation. What is more surprising, is to
see that the pause time alone, i.e., the dynamism of the
network has very little influence relative to the other fac-
tors. With the exception of the combination of the protocol
(which caused the most variation by itself) and the pause
time (which had the smallest contribution to the variation
by itself), all the combinations contribute significantly to
the variation, which should not be neglected in the analysis.
Although the percentage of malicious nodes has been kept
at the constant of one third, the number of nodes also con-
tributed significantly to the variation and was present in all
the combinations that mattered.
Table 4 shows the variations in the number of dropped
packets due to five factors and relevant combinations. The
combinations of factors are not listed if their individual con-
tribution to the variance turned out to be negligible. In
these 2510 experiments, the protocol state does not have as
much influence on the variance as in the 2310 experiments.
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Figure 8: Client and server throughput in a network
of 50 nodes with one third malicious, 20 simulation
runs.
This can be explained by the fact that the number of packets
dropped in a fortified network in the presence of one third
malicious nodes is only on the order of tens or hundreds,
whereas in a defenseless network thousands of packets are
dropped. The fortified network behaves almost as well as a
benign network, thereby levelling the difference. Again, the
pause time only contributes an almost negligible share to the
variation relative to the other factors. As can be expected
the number of malicious nodes is responsible for a signifi-
cant portion of the variation, when varied between zero and
one third. Prominent among other combinations, which also
contribute, the combination of the protocol and the number
of malicious nodes causes quite a significant portion of the
variance.
5. FUTURE WORK
The next step is to investigate the behavior of the CON-
FIDANT protocol over time, i.e., considering transient re-
moval and convergence, to determine whether the perfor-
mance converges and, if so, when.
Regarding the simulation implementation, we are cur-
rently working on enhancements such as a limited number
of friends, timeouts for reputations, and different thresholds
for events that are used to infer the malicious character of
nodes. The thresholds directly impact the tolerance of the
node’s reputation. The next step will be to extend the im-
plementation to observable attacks other than forwarding
defection, e.g., route diversion.
For the CONFIDANT protocol itself, of interest are, for
example, methods to efficiently distribute reputation infor-
mation in order to avoid malicious nodes as early as possible.
The CONFIDANT protocol assumes that nodes are au-
thenticated and that no node can pretend to be another in
order to get rid of a bad reputation. Some mechanisms to
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Figure 9: Overhead (ratio of number of ALARM
messages to number of other control messages)
caused by the CONFIDANT protocol, 50 nodes, one
third malicious, 20 simulation runs.
ensure this are being investigated, e.g., those mentioned in
Section 2. Future work will be to evaluate and incorporate
suitable solutions in the CONFIDANT protocol.
Ultimately we aim at making CONFIDANT suitable for
scalable mobile ad-hoc WANs as proposed by the Termin-
odes project [10].
6. CONCLUSIONS
Mobile ad-hoc networks exhibit new vulnerabilities to ma-
licious attacks or denial of cooperation. When designing
protocols for these networks, special care has to be taken to
include fairness mechanisms for the increased requirements
in this environment. New ways of distributing trust can be
implemented by introducing the notion of friends and mak-
ing cooperation pay off. This paper recognizes the special
requirements of mobile ad-hoc network in terms of coopera-
tion, robustness, and fairness, and analyzes the performance
of a scheme to cope with them by retaliating for malicious
behavior and warning affiliated nodes to avoid bad expe-
riences. Nodes learn not only from their own experience,
but also from observing their neighborhood and from the
experience of their friends.
Observable attacks on forwarding and routing in mobile
ad-hoc networks can be thwarted by the suggested CON-
FIDANT scheme of detection, alerting, and reaction. Per-
formance analysis by means of simulation shows a signifi-
cant improvement in terms of goodput when DSR is fortified
with the CONFIDANT protocol extensions. The overhead
for this increase is very low. The CONFIDANT protocol is
scalable in terms of the total number of nodes in a network
and performs well even with a fraction of malicious nodes
as high as 60%.
Table 3: Portion of variation due to three single
factors and their combinations, 10 applications, one
third malicious nodes.
Factor Metric:
dropped
packets
A (Number of nodes) 9.97 %
B (Protocol) 60.78 %
C (Pause time) 1.17 %
AB 9.39 %
AC 10.11 %
BC 0.73 %
ABC 7.85 %
T (Total) 100.00 %
Table 4: Portion of variation due to five single fac-
tors and relevant combinations.
Factor Metric:
dropped
packets
A (Number of nodes) 4.97%
B (Protocol) 15.17%
C (Pause time) 0.07%
D (Percentage of malicious) 17.68%
E (Number of Applications) 5.00%
AB 4.97%
AD 4.81%
BC 5%
BD 16.17%
CD 4.78%
ABD 4.81%
BCD 4.78%
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